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Abstract
The development of “operational quantum logic” points out that clas-
sical boolean structures are too rigid to describe the actual and po-
tential properties of quantum systems. Operational quantum logic
bears upon basic axioms which are motivated by empirical facts and
as such supports the dynamic shift from classical to non-classical logic
resulting into a dynamics of logic.
On the other hand, an intuitionistic perspective on operational
quantum logic, guides us in the direction of incorporating dynamics
logically by reconsidering the primitive propositions required to de-
scribe the behavior of a quantum system, in particular in view of the
emergent disjunctivity due to the non-determinism of quantum mea-
surements.
A further elaboration on “intuitionistic quantum logic” emerges
into a “dynamic operational quantum logic”, which allows us to ex-
press dynamic reasoning in the sense that we can capture how actual
properties propagate, including their temporal causal structure. It is
in this sense that passing from static operational quantum logic to
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dynamic operational quantum logic results in a true logic of dynamics
that provides a unified logical description of systems which evolve or
which are submitted to measurements. This setting reveals that even
static operational quantum logic bears a hidden dynamic ingredient in
terms of what is called “the orthomodularity” of the lattice-structure.
Focusing on the quantale semantics for dynamic operational quan-
tum logic, we delineate some points of difference with the existing
quantale semantics for (non)-commutative linear logic. Linear logic is
here to be conceived of as a resource-sensitive logic capable of dealing
with actions or in other words, it is a logic of dynamics.
We take this opportunity to dedicate this paper to Constantin
Piron at the occasion of his retirement.
1. INTRODUCTION
As a starting point for our discussion on the dynamics of logic we quote
G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, confronting the then ongoing tendencies
towards intuitionistic logic with their observation of the “logical” structure
encoded in the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, the “semantics”
of quantum theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann 1936) :
“The models for propositional calculi [of physically significant
statements in quantum mechanics] are also interesting from the
standpoint of pure logic. Their nature is determined by quasi-
physical and technical reasoning, different from the introspective
and philosophical considerations which have to guide logicians
hitherto [ ... ] whereas logicians have usually assumed that [the
orthocomplementation] properties L71-L73 of negation were the
ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of me-
chanics points to the distributive identities L6 as the weakest link
in the algebra of logic.” (p.839)
They point at a fundamental difference between Heyting algebras (the se-
mantics of intuitionistic propositional logic) and orthomodular lattices (the
“usual” semantics of quantum logic) when viewed as generalizations of Boolean
algebras (the semantics of classical propositional logic). A new intuitionis-
tic perspective on operational quantum logic (see below) provides a way of
blending these seemingly contradicting directions in which logic propagated
during the previous century (Coecke 2002) . In this paper we focus on two
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new logical structures, namely (intuitionistic) linear logic (Girard 1987, Abr-
usci 1990) which emerged from the traditional branch of logic, and dynamic
operational quantum logic (Coecke (nd), Coecke and Smets 2001), emerging
from an elaboration on the above mentioned blend. We also briefly con-
sider the “general dynamic logic” proposed in van Benthem (1994) . We
do mention epistemic action logic (e.g., Baltag 1999) and computation and
information flow (e.g., Abramsky 1993, Milner 1999) as other examples of
dynamic aspects in logic, which we unfortunately will not be able to consider
in this paper. We also won’t discuss the “geometry of interaction” paradigm
which provides a (promising) different perspective on linear logic (Abramsky
and Jagadeesan 1994), but is still in full development. Concretely we start
in section 2 with an outline of static operational quantum logic. In section
3 we survey dynamic operational quantum logic, and demonstrate that the
emerging structures do not fit in the logical system proposed in van Benthem
(1994) . In section 4 we compare dynamic operational quantum logic with
linear logic while we focus on formal and methodological differences.
2. STATIC “OLD-STYLE” OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
The Geneva School approach to the logical foundations of physics originated
with the work in Jauch and Piron (1963), Piron (1964), Jauch (1968), Jauch
and Piron (1969), Piron (1976) and Aerts (1981) as an incarnation of the
part of the research domain “foundations of physics” that is nowadays called
“Operational quantum logic” (OQL)1 — see Coecke et al (2000) for a recent
overview of its general aspects. With respect to the intuitionistic perspec-
tive and the dynamic aspects which we put forward below, we will further
refer in this paper to OQL as “sOQL”, emphasizing its static nature. More
concretely, sOQL as a theory aims to characterize physical systems, ranging
from classical to quantum, by means of their actual and potential properties,
in particular by taking an ontological rather than an empirical perspective,
but, still providing a truly operational alternative to the standard approaches
on the logical status of quantum theory.2 Since Moore (1999), Coecke et al
((nd)a,b) and Smets (2001) provide recent and detailed discussions of sOQL,
we intend in this paper to give only a concise overview, focusing on its basic
concepts and underlying epistemology. We are aware of the strong conceptual
restrictions imposed by the rigid foundation of sOQL, necessary in order to
obtain a framework with fully well-defined primitive notions. Clearly, in view
of still existing conceptual incompatibilities at the foundational level between
quantum theory and relativistic space-time and field theoretic considerations,
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the development of an essentially “towards dynamics directed”-formalism for
quantum logicality should range beyond the rigid concepts of sOQL. There-
fore, we conceive of the notions inherited from sOQL as a stepping-stone
for further development rather than something necessarily “to carry all the
way”. This is the reason why we lowercase ‘o’ in our notation DoQL referring
to “dynamic operational quantum logic” and IoQL, when referring to “intu-
itionistic operational quantum logic”. In particular the sOQL assumptions
(see below) of “a particular physical system which is considered as distinct
from its surroundings”, “the specification of states as a (pre-defined) set”
and “the a priori specification of a particular physical system itself” need
too be reconsidered when crossing the edges of sOQL (which itself was de-
signed to clarify the structural description of quantum systems and justify
an ontological perspective for non-relativistic quantum theory).
First we want to clarify that the operationalism which forms the core of
sOQL points to a pragmatic attitude and not to any specific doctrine one can
encounter in last century’s philosophy of science (Coecke et al (nd)a). Linked
to the fact that we defend the position of critical scientific realism in relation
of sOQL, operationality points to the underlying assumption that with every
property of a physical system we can associate experimental procedures that
can be performed on the system, each such experimental procedure includ-
ing the specification of a well-defined positive result for which certainty is
exactly guaranteed by the actual existence of the corresponding property. In
particular, while on the epistemological level our knowledge of what exists is
based on what we could measure or observe, on the ontological level “phys-
ical” properties have an extension in reality and are not reducible to sets
of procedures.3 Focusing on the stance of critical scientific realism, we first
adopt an ontological realistic position and a correspondence theory of truth.4
Though, contrary to naive realists we do adopt the thesis of fallibilism by
which truth in relation to scientific theories has to be pursued but can only be
approached. As such we agree with Niiniluoto (1999) that scientific progress
can be characterized in terms of increasing truthlikeness. Furthermore, we
believe that reality can indeed be captured in conceptual frameworks, though
contrary to Niiniluoto we like to link this position to a “weak” form of concep-
tual idealism. Concentrating for instance on Rescher’s conceptual idealism as
presented in Rescher (1973, 1987 §11) and revised in Rescher (1995 §8), this
position maintains that a description of physical reality involves reference to
mental operations, it doesn’t deny ontological realism and also adopts the
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thesis of fallibilism. This position is opposed to an ontological idealism in
which the mind produces the “real” objects. As one might expect, we want
to stress that we are not inclined to adopt Rescher’s strict Kantian distinc-
tion between reality out there and reality as we perceive it, though we are
attracted by the idea of capturing ontological reality in mind-correlative con-
ceptual frameworks. Once we succeed in giving such a description of reality,
it approaches according to us the ontological world close enough to omit a
Kantian distinction between the realms of noumena and phenomena. Why
it is of importance for us to reconcile critical realism with a weak form of
conceptual idealism becomes clear when we focus on sOQL. Firstly, we can-
not escape the fact that in our theory we focus on parts of reality considered
as well-defined and distinct which we can then characterize as physical sys-
tems. Secondly we have to identify the properties of those systems which
is a mind-involving activity. To be more explicit, a physicist can believe
that a system ontologically has specific actual and potential properties, but
to give the right characterization of the physical system he has to consider
the definite experimental projects which can test those properties so that,
depending on the results he would obtain, he can be reinforced in his beliefs
or has to revise them.5 How sOQL formally is built up, using the notions
of actual properties, potential properties and definite experimental projects,
will be clarified below. To recapitulate we finish this paragraph by stressing
that we focus in our scientific activity on parts of the external world, reality
is mind-independent, though the process of its description “involves” some
mind-dependent characterizations.
Let us introduce the primitive concrete notions on which sOQL relies,
explicitly following Coecke et al ((nd)a):
• We take a particular physical system to be a part of the ostensively
external world which is considered as distinct from its surroundings —
see Moore (1999) for a discussion on this matter;
• A singular realization of the given particular physical system is a con-
ceivable manner of being of that system within a circumscribed expe-
riental context;
• States E ∈ Σ of a given particular physical system are construed as
abstract names encoding its possible singular realizations;
• A definite experimental project α ∈ Q on the given particular physi-
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cal system is a real experimental procedure which may be effectuated
on that system where we have defined in advance what would be the
positive response should it be performed.
• Properties a ∈ L of a given particular physical system are construed as
candidate elements of reality corresponding to the definite experimental
projects defined for that system. We as such obtain a mapping of
definite experimental projects Q on properties L .
The notion of an element of reality was first introduced in Einstein et al
(1935) as follows:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty [...] the value of a physical quantity, then there ex-
ists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity” (p.777).
While this formulation is explicitly the starting point for Piron’s early work,
we insist that Piron’s operational concept of element of reality is both more
precise and allows theoretical deduction, being based on an empirically acces-
sible notion of counterfactual performance rather than a metaphorical notion
of non-perturbation. The basic ingredient that we inherit from this setting is
the agreement that actual properties exist. Before we give a more rigid char-
acterization of how an actual property is conceived within sOQL, we want to
remark that Piron adopted the Aristotelian concepts of actuality and poten-
tiality and placed them in a new framework (see e.g. Piron (1983)). For an
analysis of how these notions, used within sOQL, are still related to the old
Aristotelian ones, we refer to Smets (2001). Let us just briefly mention here
that with regard to actuality, an actual property is within sOQL conceived
as an attribute which “exists”; it is some realization in reality or in other
words; an element of reality. A potential property on the other hand, does
not exist in the same way as an actual one, it is conceived merely as a capa-
bility with respect to an actualization since there is always a chance — i.e.
except for the absurd property — that it could be realized after the system
has been changed without destroying it. It will become clear that a property
can be actual or potential depending on the state in which we consider the
particular physical system. Similarly we can say that certainty of obtaining a
positive answer when performing a definite experimental project depends on
the state of the system. In order to construct our theory further we need to
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introduce the following relationship between definite experimental projects,
states and properties:
• A definite experimental project α is called certain for a given singular
realization of the given particular physical system if it is sure that the
positive response would be obtained should α be effectuated;
• A property a is called actual for a given state if any, and so all, of
the definite experimental projects corresponding to the property a are
certain for any, and so all, of the singular realizations encoded by that
state. A property is called potential when it is not actual.
In particular is one of the essential achievements of sOQL that it gives a con-
sistent and coherent ontological account of physical properties contra certain
‘overextrapolations’ claimed to be inherent in quantum theory. The quantum
mechanical formalism itself indeed allows a characterization of the properties
of a quantum system as being in correspondence with the closed subspaces
of the Hilbert space describing the system in the above sense: Definite ex-
perimental projects α expressible in quantum theory are of the form, “the
value of an observable is in region E ⊂ σ(H)”, where σ(H) is the spectrum
of the self-adjoint operator H describing the observable, thus we can write
α(H,E); more explicitly, the definite experimental project α(H,E) consists
of measuring the observable H and obtaining an outcome in E; the corre-
sponding property a is then represented by the closed subspace of fixpoints
of the projector PE that arises via decomposition of H according to von Neu-
mann’s spectral decomposition theorem since only the states that imply the
actuality of that property, that is, the states represented by a ray included in
that subspace, will yield a positive outcome with certainty when “we would
perform α(H,E)”.
Given the above notions, it becomes possible to introduce an operation on
the collection Q of definite experimental projects. What we have in mind is
the product of a family of definite experimental projects ΠA which obtains
its operational meaning in the following way:
• The product ΠA of a family A of definite experimental projects is
the definite experimental project “choose arbitrarily one α in A and
effectuate it and attribute the obtained answer to ΠA ”.
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More explicitly, given a particular realization of the system, ΠA is a certain
definite experimental project if and only if each member of A is a certain def-
inite experimental project. Formally it becomes possible to pre-order definite
experimental projects by means of their certainty:
• α ≺ β := β is certain whenever α is certain.
The notions of a trivial definite experimental project, which is always certain
and an absurd definite experimental project, which is never certain, can be
introduced and play the role of respectively maximal and minimal element
of the collection Q. The trivial and absurd definite experimental projects
give rise on the level of properties to a trivial and absurd property, the first
is always actual while the latter is always potential. Through the correspon-
dence between definite experimental projects and properties, the mentioned
pre-order relation induces a partial order relation on L :
• a ≤ b := b is actual whenever a is actual.
The product of a collection of definite experimental projects with correspond-
ing collection of properties A provides a greatest lower bound or meet for any
A ⊆ L , and as such the set of properties L forms a complete lattice. Indeed,
once we have the “meet” of any collection of properties, we can construct
the operation of “join” or least upper bound via Birkhoff’s theorem stating
that for a given A ⊆ L:
∨
A =
∧
{x ∈ L | (∀a ∈ A)a ≤ x} .
Note however that contrary to the meet, the join admits of no direct oper-
ational meaning in sOQL. Even more, we see that the join of a collection
of properties need not, and generically does not, correspond to a classical
disjunction since the following implication is only secured in one direction,
• (∃a ∈ A: a is actual) ⇒
∨
A is actual.
With respect to the meet we do have
• (∀a ∈ A: a is actual) ⇔
∧
A is actual,
following directly from the identification of the meet with the product of
definite experimental projects.
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The property lattice description of a physical system in sOQL allows a
dual description by means of the system’s states (Moore 1995, 1999) in terms
of maximal state sets µ(a) ⊆ Σ for which a common property a ∈ L is ac-
tual whenever the system is in a state in E ∈ µ(a) , these sets being ordered
by inclusion. More explicitly, the state-property duality may be straightfor-
wardly characterized once we introduce the forcing relation ⊲ defined by E ⊲a
if and only if the property a is actual in the state E , by the fact that we can
associate to each property a the set µ(a) = {E ∈ Σ | E ⊲ a} of states in which
it is actual, and to each state E the set S(E) = {a ∈ L | E ⊲ a} of its actual
properties. Formally µ : L → P (Σ) : a 7→ µ(a) is injective, satisfies the con-
dition µ(
∧
A) =
⋂
µ[A] and is called the Cartan map. In particular we now
see that actuality can be studied at the level of either states or properties
since we have
E ∈ µ(a)⇔ E ⊲ a⇔ a ∈ S(E) .
We will be a bit more explicit about the dual description of a physical sys-
tem by means of its states and operationally motivate the introduction of a
symmetric and antireflexive orthogonality relation on the set Σ:
• Two states E and E ′ are called orthogonal, written E ⊥ E ′, if there
exists a definite experimental project which is certain for the first and
impossible for the second.
If we equip Σ with ⊥, we can consider LΣ as the set of biorthogonal subsets,
i.e., those A ⊆ Σ with A⊥⊥ = A for A⊥ = {E ′ | (∀E ∈ A)E ⊥ E ′} . Whenever
⊥ is separating (Coecke et al (nd)a), the codomain restriction of the Cartan
map µ to the set of biorthogonals gives us an isomorphism of complete atom-
istic orthocomplemented lattices (see below) extending the dual description
of a physical system by its state space Σ and its property lattice L — for de-
tails we refer to Moore (1999) and Coecke et al ((nd)a). It thus follows that
LΣ is an atomistic lattice where the singletons {E} = {E}
⊥⊥ are the atoms.
Let us first introduce the notion of an atomistic lattice more explicitly:
• A complete lattice L is called atomistic if each element a ∈ L is gener-
ated by its subordinate atoms,
a =
∨
{p ∈ ΣL | p ≤ a} ,
where the p ∈ ΣL are by definition the minimal nonzero elements of L .
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Under the assumption that states are in bijective correspondence with atoms,
Σ = ΣL ⊆ L , each property lattice is atomistic in the sense that
a =
∨
{
∧
S(E) | E ∈ µ(a)}
for each a ∈ L . Note that
∧
S(E) is the strongest actual property of the
collection S(E) which as such “represents” the state.
While we will only work with complete atomistic lattices in the following,
we want to finish off this section with an example explaining that a property
lattice description for a quantum system will not lead to a boolean algebra.
Under the assumption that properties have opposite properties and even more
that each property a ∈ L is the opposite of another one, we can formally
introduce an orthocomplementation, i.e.:
• A surjective antitone involution ′ : L → L satisfying a∧a′ = 0 , a ≤ b⇒
b′ ≤ a′ and a′′ = a . A lattice equipped with an orthocomplementation
is usually abbreviated as an ortholattice.
Consider now the property lattice description of a photon as presented in
Piron (1978) . Take as a physical system a propagating photon which is
linearly polarized. A definite experimental project αφ is then defined by:
• i. The apparatus: A polarizer oriented with angle φ and a counter
placed behind it; ii. The manual: Place the polarizer and counter
within the passage of the photon; iii. If one registers the passage of the
photon through the polarizer, the result is “yes” and otherwise “no”.
Clearly, a property a corresponding to αφ is
called actual if it is certain that αφ would lead
to the response “yes”, should we perform the
experiment. In the diagram (Fig 1) of this
photon, we consider some of its properties ex-
plicitly: a corresponds to αφ, b to α
′
φ, a
′ to
αφ+π/2 and b
′ to α′φ+π/2. One immediately
sees that this lattice is not boolean since dis-
tributivity is violated in the sense that a∧(b∨a′) = a while (a∧b)∨(a∧a′) = 0.
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3. DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
Contrary to the static approach outlined above we will now analyze how an
actual property before alteration will induce a property to be actual after-
wards and, conversely, we characterize causes for actuality. The obtained
result will then give rise to DoQL, when passing via IoQL. We stress that
both these approaches are still under full development. These developments
were preceded by a representation theorem for deterministic evolutions of
quantum systems as given in Faure et al (1995) and for which DoQL pro-
vides an extension to non-deterministic cases. The new primitive concept (as
compared to sOQL) is the notion of induction, defined in Amira et al (1998)
— see also Coecke et al (2001) and Smets (2001) :
• An induction e ∈ ǫs is a physical procedure that can be effectuated
on a particular physical system s. This procedure, when carried out,
might change s, modify the collection of its actual properties and thus
its state, or even destroy s.
On the collection ǫs of all inductions performable on a physical system s
we can consider two operations, one corresponding to the arbitrary choice
of inductions and one corresponding to a finite concatenation of inductions.
Following Amira et al (1998) and Coecke et al (2001) , the finite concatenation
of inductions e1, e2, ..., en ∈ ǫs is the induction e1&e2&...&en which consists
of first performing e1 then e2, then ... until en. The arbitrary choice of
inductions in {ei | i ∈ I} ⊆ ǫs is the induction
∨
i ei consisting of performing
one of the ei, chosen in any possible way.
6 Defined as such, an act of induction
can for example be the assurance of a free evolution (Faure et al 1995),
indeterministic evolution (Coecke and Stubbe 1999), e.g., a measurement
(Coecke and Smets 2000, 2001), or the action of one subsystem in a compound
system on another one (Coecke 2000) . For reasons of formal simplicity we
will only focus on inductions which cannot lead to the destruction of the
physical system under consideration.7 As such we presume that an induction
cannot alter the nature of a physical system, whereby we mean that what can
happen is that a system’s state is shifted within the given initial state space,
i.e., that the actuality and potentiality of the properties in the initial property
lattice is changed. This implies that the description of a physical system by
means of its state space or property lattice encompasses those states in which
the system may be after performing an induction. More explicitly, we can
point to the particular type of properties which are actual or potential before
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the system is altered and which contain information about the actuality or
potentiality of particular properties after the system is altered. We introduce
this particular type of properties formally (Coecke et al 2001) :8
(e, a) : ǫ× Lop → Lop : (e, a) 7→ e.a (1)
where the reason for reversal of the lattice order (this is what “op” in Lop
stands for) will be discussed below. The property e.a stands for “guaranteeing
the actuality of a”. Existence of a property e.a is indeed operationally assured
in the following way: given that a corresponds to α , e.a corresponds to a
definite experimental project “e.α” of the form “first execute the induction
e and then perform the definite experimental project α , and, attribute the
outcome of α to e.α” (Faure et al 1995, Coecke 2000, Coecke et al 2001) . In
terms of actuality, following Smets (2001) :
“e.a is an actual property for a system in a certain realization if
it is sure that a would be an actual property of the system should
we perform induction e .”
This explains that if e.a is actual it indeed “guarantees” the actuality of
a with respect to e, while if e.a is potential it does not. This expression
crystallizes into the idea of introducing a causal relation:
e
❀ ⊆ L1 ×L2 ,
where subscript 1 points to the lattice before e and 2 to the lattice after e ,
as follows (Coecke et al 2001) :
• a
e
❀ b := the actuality of a before e induces (or, guarantees) the actu-
ality of b after e.
Against the background of our characterization of e.a we now see that e.a
e
❀ a
will always be valid and that
a
e
❀ b ⇐⇒ a ≤ e.b ,
so
e
❀ fully characterizes the action of e.− : L2 → L1 . In case e stands for the
induction “freeze” (with obvious significance, given a referential), conceived
as timeless, then
e
❀ reduces to the partial ordering ≤ of L1 = L2 .
To link the physical-operational level to a mathematical level, we associate
with every induction e ∈ ǫs a map called property propagation and a map
called property causation (Coecke et al 2001) :
12
1) Property Causation:
e¯∗ : L2 → L1 : a2 7→ e.a2 =
∨
{a1 ∈ L1 | a1
e
❀ a2} ;
2) Property Propagation:
e¯∗ : L1 → L2 : a1 7→
∧
{a2 ∈ L2 | a1
e
❀ a2} .
Given those mappings, clearly e¯∗(a2) is the weakest property whose actuality
guarantees the actuality of a2 and e¯
∗(a1) is the strongest property whose
actuality is induced by that of a1. Further we immediately obtain the Galois
adjunction9 e¯∗(e¯∗(a2)) ≤ a2 and a1 ≤ e¯∗(e¯
∗(a1)) , denoted as e¯
∗ ⊣ e¯∗ , since
a ≤ e¯∗(b) ⇐⇒ a
e
❀ b ⇐⇒ e¯∗(a) ≤ b .
In Coecke et al (2001) this adjunction is referred to as “causal duality”, since
it expresses the dual expressibility of dynamic behavior for physical systems
respectively in terms of propagation of properties and causal assignment.10
We also recall here that this argument towards causal duality suffices to
establish evolution for quantum systems, i.e., systems with the lattice of
closed subspaces of a Hilbert space as property lattice, in terms of linear or
anti-linear maps (Faure et al 1995) and compoundness in terms of the tensor
product of the corresponding Hilbert spaces (Coecke 2000) . It also follows
from the above that the action defined in eq.(1) defines a quantale module
action (Coecke et al 2001) — quantales will be discussed below. Crucial here
is the fact that (
∨
i ei) · α and Πi(ei · α) clearly define the same property
(
∨
i ei) · a =
∧
i(ei · a) , since both Π for definite experimental projects and∨
for inductions express choice. Accordingly, the opposite ordering in eq.(1)
then matches L-meets with ǫ-joins.
In the above we discussed the strongest property e¯∗(a1) of which actuality
is induced by an induction due to actuality of a1 , but only for maximally
deterministic evolutions this fully describes the system’s behavior. In other
cases it makes sense to consider how (true logical) disjunctions of properties
propagate, as such allowing accurate representation of for example the emer-
gence of disjunction in a perfect quantum measurement (Coecke 2002, Coecke
and Smets 2000, Smets 2001) due to the uncertainty on the measurement out-
come whenever the system is not in an eigenstate of this measurement.11 First
we introduce the notion of an actuality set as a set of properties of which at
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least one element is actual, clearly encoding logical disjunction in terms of
actuality. As before we want to express propagation and causal assignment
of these actuality sets. While we shift from the level of properties to sets of
properties, we will have to take care that we don’t loose particular informa-
tion on the structure of L , in particular its operationally derived order. The
solution to this problem consists in considering a certain kind of ideal. More
specifically we work with the set DI(L) ⊆ P (L) , P (L) being the powerset
of L , of which the elements are called property sets and which formally are
the so-called distributive ideals of L , introduced in a purely mathematical
setting in Bruns and Lakser (1970) :
• A distributive ideal is an order ideal, i.e. if a ≤ b ∈ I then a ∈ I and
I 6= ∅, and is closed under distributive joins, i.e. if A ⊆ I ∈ DI(L)
then
∨
A ∈ I whenever we have
∀b ∈ L : b ∧
∨
A =
∨
{b ∧ a | a ∈ A}.
Intuitively, this choice can be motivated as follows (a much more rigid argu-
mentation does exists):12 i. a first choice for encoding disjunctions would be
the powerset itself, however, if a ≤ b we don’t have {a} ⊆ {b} so we do not
preserve order; otherwise stated, if a < b then the “propositions” {a} and
{a, b} (read: either a or b is actual) mean the same thing, since actuality
of b is implied by that of a ; ii. we can clearly overcome this problem by
considering order ideals
I(L) := {↓ [A]|A ⊆ L} ⊂ P (L) ;
however, in case the property lattice would be a complete Heyting algebra in
which all joins encode disjunctions, then A and {
∨
A} again mean the same
thing; this redundancy is then exactly eliminated by considering distributive
ideals (Coecke 2002, Coecke and Smets 2001) . For L atomistic and Σ ⊆ L ,
DI(L) ∼= P (Σ) which implies that DI(L) is a complete atomistic boolean
algebra (Coecke 2002) .
Similarly as for properties, for property sets we can operationally motivate
the introduction of a causal relation
e
❀ ⊆ DI(L)1 ×DI(L)2 :
• A
e
❀ B := if property set A is an actuality set before e , A induces that
property set B is an actuality set after e .
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To every induction we associate a map called property set causation and a
map called property set propagation:
1) Property set causation
eˆ∗ : DI(L)2 → DI(L)1 : A2 7→ C(
⋃
{A1 ∈ DI(L)1 | A1
e
❀ A2})
2) Property set propagation
eˆ∗ : DI(L)1 → DI(L)2 : A1 7→
⋂
{A2 ∈ DI(L)2 | A1
e
❀ A2}
where
C : P (L)→ P (L) : A 7→
⋂
{B ∈ DI(L) | A ⊆ B} .
Similar as above we obtain an adjunction eˆ∗ ⊣ eˆ∗ following from:
eˆ∗(A)1 ⊆ A2 ⇐⇒ A1
e
❀ A2 ⇐⇒ A1 ⊆ eˆ∗(A2)
In case the induction e stands for “freeze” we obtain A
e
❀ B = A ⊆ B. Note
that the join preservation that follows from the adjunction eˆ∗ ⊣ eˆ∗ expresses
the physically obvious preservation of disjunction for temporal processes.
It is however also important to stress here that not all maps eˆ∗ : DI(L)1 →
DI(L)2 are physically meaningful. Indeed, any physical induction admits
mutually adjoint maps e¯∗ and e¯∗ with the significance discussed above, the
existence of such a map e¯∗ : L1 → L2 forcing eˆ
∗ to satisfy a join continuity
condition (Coecke and Stubbe 1999, Coecke et al 2001, Coecke 2002), namely:
∨
A =
∨
B =⇒
∨
eˆ∗(A) =
∨
eˆ∗(B) , (2)
which indeed expresses well-definedness of a corresponding e¯∗ since given an
actuality set A , the strongest property that is actual with certainty is
∨
A .
It is exactly in the existence of a non-trivial condition as in eq.(2) that the
non-classicality of quantum theory comes in. As such, both causal dualities,
the one on the level of properties and the other on the level of property
sets, provide a physical law on transitions, respectively condition eq.(2) and
preservation of DI(L)-joins. We also want to stress a manifest difference
here with the setting in van Benthem (1994) :
“The most general model of dynamics is simply this: some system
moves through a space of possibilities. Thus there is to be some
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set [Σ] of relevant states (cognitive, physical, etc.) and a family
[{Re| e ∈ ǫ}] of binary transition relations among them, corre-
sponding to actions that could be performed to change from one
state to another. [...] Let us briefly consider a number of dynamic
‘genres’, [...] • Real action in the world changes actual physical
states. [...] What are most general operations on actions? Ubiq-
uitous examples are sequential composition and choice .” (p.109,
110, 112)
Thus it seems to us that the author aims to cover our study of dynamic
behavior of physical systems. He moreover states (van Benthem 1994) :
“The main claim of this paper is that the above systems of re-
lational algebra and dynamic logic provide a convenient archi-
tecture for bringing out essential logical features of action and
cognition.” (p.130)
We claim here that relational structures are inappropriate for modeling phys-
ical dynamics, even classically ! Let us motivate this claim. It follows from
the above that transitions of properties of physical systems are internally
structured by the causal duality, which in the particular case of non-classical
systems restricts possible transitions. Recalling that for atomistic property
lattices we have P (Σ) ∼= DI(L) it is definitely true that any join preserving
map eˆ∗ : DI(L)1 → DI(L)2 defines a unique relation Re ⊆ Σ1 × Σ2 , and
conversely, any relation R ⊆ Σ1 ×Σ2 defines a unique (join preserving) map
fR : DI(L)1 → DI(L)2 . Next, any relation R ⊆ Σ1 × Σ2 has an inverse
R−1 ⊆ Σ2 × Σ1 and this inverse plays a major role in van Benthem (1991,
1994) as converse action . However, nothing assures that when eˆ∗ satisfies
eq.(2) that the map fR−1e : DI(L)2 → DI(L)1 encoding the relational inverse
satisfies eq.(2) , and as such, has any physical significance at all.13 Obviously,
this argument applies only to non-classical systems. More generally, however,
since it is the duality between causation and propagation at the DI(L)-level
that guarantees preservation of disjunction we feel that it should be present in
any modelization, and although relations and union preserving maps between
powersets are in bijective correspondence, they have fundamentally different
dual realizations: relations have inverses, and union preserving maps between
powersets have adjoints, and these two do not correspond at all, respectively
being encoded as (in terms of maps between powersets):
fR−1e (A) = {p ∈ Σ|∃q ∈ A : q ∈ eˆ
∗({p})}
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eˆ∗(A) = {p ∈ Σ|∀q ∈ A : q ∈ eˆ
∗({p})}
if it was even only by the fact that one preserves unions and the other one
intersections. As such, the seemingly innocent choice of representation in
terms of relations or union preserving maps between powersets does have
some manifest consequence in terms of the implementation of causal duality.
In the remaining part of this section we concentrate on the logic of ac-
tuality sets as initiated in Coecke (2002). Introduce the following primitive
connectives:
∧
DI(L)
: P (DI(L))→ DI(L) : A 7→
⋂
A ;
∨
DI(L)
: P (DI(L))→ DI(L) : A 7→ C(
⋃
A) ;
→DI(L) : DI(L)×DI(L) : (B,C) 7→
∨
DI(L)
{A ∈ DI(L) | A ∩ B ⊆ C}
= {a ∈ L|∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} ;
RDI(L) : DI(L)→ DI(L) : A 7→↓ (
∨
L
A) .
While the first three connectives are standard in intuitionistic logic, RDI(L)
should be conceived as a “resolution-connective” allowing us to recuperate
the logical structure of properties on the level of property sets (Coecke 2002).
In particular, for classical systems we have RDI(L) = idDI(L). Note that the
condition in eq.(2) now becomes:
RDI(L)(A) = RDI(L)(B) =⇒ RDI(L)(eˆ
∗(A)) = RDI(L)(eˆ
∗(B)) , (3)
restricting the physically admissible transitions. Clearly, this condition is
trivially satisfied for classical systems.
When concentrating on the material implication, we want to stress that
on the level of L only for the properties in a distributive sublattice we can
say the following:
p |= (a→L b) ⇐⇒ {p} ∩ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)
⇐⇒ p ∈ µ(a)⇒ p ∈ µ(b)
⇐⇒ p |= a⇒ p |= b .
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In that case, this implication satisfies the strengthened law of entailment:
µ(a→L b) = Σ ⇐⇒ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b) ⇐⇒ a ≤ b .
Note that in the non-distributive case for a →L b = a
′ ∨ b ∈ L we can only
say that (p |= a →L b) ⇐ (p |= a ⇒ p |= b), which goes together with the
fact that there are examples of orthomodular lattices for which a′ ∨ b = 1
while a 6≤ b. Hence in general, for T = {p ∈ Σ | p |= a ⇒ p |= b} there will
not be an element x ∈ L for which µ(x) = T . There are of course examples of
other implications which do satisfy the strengthened law of entailment in the
orthomodular case — see for instance Kalmbach (1983) . It is now our aim
to focus on the implication for elements in DI(L). First we lift the Cartan
map to the level of property sets µ(A) :=
⋃
µ[A] ⊆ ΣL , then we obtain the
following semantical interpretation:
p |= (A→DI(L) B) ⇐⇒ {p} ∩ µ(A) ⊆ µ(B)
⇐⇒ p ∈ µ(A)⇒ p ∈ µ(B)
⇐⇒ p |= A⇒ p |= B .
From this it follows that
µ(A→DI(L) B) = {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A)⇒ (p |= B)} ,
which allows us to reformulate the given static implication (− →DI(L) −) as
follows (Coecke (nd), Coecke and Smets 2001):
(A→DI(L) B) =
∨
DI(L)
{C ∈ DI(L) | ∀D ⊢ C : (D ⊢ A⇒ D ⊢ B)}
= {c ∈ L | ∀d ≤ c : (d ∈ A⇒ d ∈ B)} ,
where D ⊢ A ⇔ ∀p ∈ µ(D) : p ∈ µ(A). Again this implication satisfies the
strengthened law of entailment in the sense that
(A→DI(L) B) = L ⇐⇒ A ⊆ B
and is as operation the right adjoint with respect to the conjunction
∧
DI(L) ,
as it is always the case for the implication connective of a complete Heyting
algebra — see for example Borceux (1994) or Johnstone (1982) :
(A ∧DI(L) −) ⊣ (A→DI(L) −) .
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As for the static material implication defined above, we now want to look
for a dynamic propagation-implication satisfying the following:
(A
e
→ B) = L ⇐⇒ A
e
❀ B .
The candidate which naturally arises is (Coecke (nd), Coecke and Smets
2001):
(A
e
→ B) := {c ∈ L | ∀d ≤ c : (d ∈ A⇒ eˆ∗(↓d) ⊆ B)} .
indicated by a semantical interpretation as
µ(A→DI(L) B) = {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A)⇒ (eˆ
∗({p}) |= B)} .
In case e stands for the induction “freeze” we see that
e
→ reduces to→DI(L) .
Similar as in the static case, we can find an induction-labeled operation as
left adjoint to the dynamic propagation-implication, i.e.,
(A⊗e −) ⊣ (A
e
→ −) with A⊗e B := eˆ
∗(A ∧DI(L) B) .
It is important here to notice that this dynamic conjunction is a commutative
operation. Since eˆ∗ preserves joins and since inDI(L) binary meets distribute
over arbitrary joins (being a complete Heyting algebra) we moreover have
(Coecke (nd)) :
A⊗e (
∨
DI(L)
B) =
∨
DI(L)
{A⊗e B | B ∈ B} ,
so DI(L) is equipped with operations
e
→ and ⊗e , for every e ∈ ǫs the latter
yielding “commutative quantales”. Let us give the definition of a quantale
(Rosenthal 1990, 1996, Paseka and Rosicky 2000) :
• A quantale is a complete lattice Q together with an associative binary
operation ◦ that satisfies a◦(
∨
i bi) =
∨
i(a◦bi) and (
∨
i bi)◦a =
∨
i(bi◦a)
for all a, bi ∈ Q .
Thus, for each induction e we obtain that (DI(L),
∨
DI(L),⊗e) is a commu-
tative quantale since ⊗e is a commutative operation. In case e stands for
“freeze”, the mentioned quantale becomes a locale (DI(L),
∨
DI(L),∧DI(L)) ,
i.e., a complete Heyting algebra. Recall here that a locale is a quantale with
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as quantale product the meet-operation of the complete lattice, and one ver-
ifies that this definition exactly coincides with that of a complete Heyting
algebra — for details we refer again to Borceux (1994) or Johnstone (1982) .
As for the propagation-implications which, when valid, express a for-
ward causal relation between property sets, we can introduce causation-
implications. The relation to which these causation-implications match will
be a backward relation introduced as follows (Coecke and Smets 2001):
• A
e
" B := If property set B is necessarily an actuality set after e then
property set A was an actuality set before e .
Formally we see
A
e
" B ⇐⇒ eˆ∗(B) ⊆ A .
The causation-implications we want to work with now have to satisfy:
A
e
← B = L ⇐⇒ A
e
" B .
The candidate which satisfies this condition is:
(A
e
← B) := {c ∈ L | ∀d ≤ c : (d ∈ A⇐ eˆ∗(↓d) ⊆ B)} .
indicated by a semantical interpretation as
µ(A←DI(L) B) = {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A)⇐ (eˆ
∗({p}) |= B)} .
As such we see that when A
e
← B is valid (i.e. equal to L) then it expresses
that if property set B is an actuality set after e then property set A was
an actuality set before e. Again we have a left adjoint for the causation-
implication:
(− e⊗B) ⊣ (−
e
← B) with A e⊗B := A ∧DI(L) eˆ∗(B) .
Thus we can additionally equip DI(L) with
e
← and e⊗ , for each e ∈ ǫs the
latter yielding non-commutative co-quantales (DI(L) ,
∧
DI(L) , e⊗) , i.e., with
a distributive property with respect to meets. Note that the preservation of
joins for propagation versus that of meets for causation reflects here in a
two-sided distributivity respectively with respect to joins and meets. Indeed,
since we have:
(L ⊗e −) = eˆ
∗(−) (L e⊗−) = eˆ∗(−)
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this distributivity truly encodes the respective join and meet preservation
and consequently, also the causal duality.
It is important to remark that the semantics we obtain is the complete
Heyting algebra of actuality sets DI(L) equipped with additional dynamic
connectives to express causation and propagation:
(
DI(L) ,RDI(L) ,
∨
DI(L)
,
∧
DI(L)
,¬, {⊗e, e⊗,
e
→,
e
←,
e
¬| e ∈ ǫ}
)
.
It turns out that we have a forward negation ¬ which does not depend on
e , and thus coincides with that of “freeze”, i.e., the static one, and a back-
ward negation
e
¬ which by contrast does depend on e — for a discussion of
these negations we refer to Coecke (nd) and Smets (2001) . Note here that
DI(L) is also a left quantale module for ǫˆ = {eˆ | e ∈ ǫs} when consider-
ing the pointwise action of (e.−) . This then intertwines the two quantale
structures that emerge in our setting. We end this paragraph by mentioning
that it is possible to implement other kinds of implications on DI(L) that
extend the causal relation. As an example, it is possible to extend DI(L)
with bi-labeled families of non-commutative quantales rendering bi-labeled
implications, some of them extending the ones presented in this paper.
In Coecke and Smets (2001) it is argued that the Sasaki adjunction is
an incarnation of causal duality for the particular case of a quantum mea-
surement ϕa with a projector (on a) as corresponding self-adjoint operator.
This has as a striking consequence, since validity of the Sasaki adjunction
is equivalent to “orthomodularity”, sOQL embodies a hidden dynamical in-
gredient which is algebraically identifiable as orthomodularity. One could as
such argue that the necessity of the passage from sOQL to DoQL was already
announced within sOQL itself, it was just waiting to be revealed. As a more
radical statement one could say that due to this hidden dynamical ingredi-
ent, it is impossible to give a full sense to quantum theory in logical terms
within an essentially static setting. Following Coecke and Smets (2001), this
fact can be deduced from DoQL by eliminating the emergent disjunctivity
when introducing modalities with respect to actuality and conditioning. We
can in that case derive that the labeled dynamic hooks that encode quantum
measurements act on properties as
(a1
ϕa
→ a2) := (a1 →L (a
S
→ a2)) and (a1
ϕa
← a2) := ((a
S
→ a2)→L a1)
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where (−
S
→ −) is the well-known Sasaki hook and we identify a and {a}. One
could say that the transition from either classical or intuitionistic logicality
to “true”quantum logicality entails besides the introduction of an additional
unary connective “operational resolution” the shift from a binary implica-
tion connective to a ternary connective where two of the arguments have an
ontological connotation and the third, the new one, an empirical.
4. COMPARISON WITH LINEAR LOGIC
We will analyze another logic of dynamics, namely linear logic, while focusing
on the differences with DoQL especially with respect to the quantale struc-
tures mentioned above. We intend to give a brief overview of the basic ideas
behind “Linear logic” as introduced in Girard (1987, 1989) . It’s categorical
semantics in terms of a ∗-autonomous category appeared in Barr (1979) and
it is fair to say that already in Lambek (1958) a non-commutative fragment
of linear logic was present. We follow the discussion of Smets (2001).
The main advantage linear logic has with respect to classical/intuitionistic
logic is that it allows us to deal with actions versus situations in the sense
of stable truths (Girard 1989). This should be understood in the sense that
linear logic is often called a resource sensitive logic. The linear logical for-
mulas can be conceived as expressing finite resources, the classical formulas
then being interpretable as corresponding to unlimited or eternal resources.
Allowing ourselves to be a bit more formal on this matter, resource sensitiv-
ity is linked to the explicit control of the weakening and contraction rules.
As structural rules, weakening and contraction will be discarded in the gen-
eral linear logical framework. Note that in non-commutative linear logic,
to which we will come back later, the exchange-rule will also be dropped.
We use A,B for sequences of well formed formulas and a, b for well formed
formulas. Sequents are conceived as usual:
(weakeningL) A−→B
A,a−→B
(weakeningR) A−→B
A−→B,a
(contractionL) A,a,a−→B
A,a−→B
(contractionR) A−→a,a,B
A−→a,B
(exchangeL) A1,a,b,A2−→B
A1,b,a,A2−→B
(exchangeR) A−→B1,a,b,B2
A−→B1,b,a,B2
Dropping weakening and contraction implies that linear formulas cannot be
duplicated or contracted at random, in other words, our resources are re-
stricted. An important consequence of dropping these two structural rules
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is the existence of two kinds of “disjunctions” and “conjunctions”.14 We will
obtain a so-called additive disjunction ⊕ and additive conjunction ⊓ and a
so-called multiplicative disjunction ℘ and multiplicative conjunction ⊗. The
following left and right rules will make their differences clear.
(⊓ R) A→a,B A−→b,B
A−→a⊓b,B
(⊕ L) A,a−→B A,b−→B
A,a⊕b−→B
(⊓ L) A,a−→B
A,a⊓b−→B
A,b−→B
A,a⊓b−→B
(⊕ R) A−→a,B
A−→a⊕b,B
A−→b,B
A−→a⊕b,B
(⊗ R) A1−→a,B1 A2−→b,B2
A1,A2−→a⊗b,B1,B2
(℘ L) A1,a−→B1 A2,b−→B2
A1,A2,a℘b−→B1,B2
(⊗ L) A,a,b−→B
A,a⊗b−→B
(℘ R) A−→a,b,B
A−→a℘b,B
By allowing the structural rules and by using (⊗) we can express the (⊓)-rules
and vice versa. A similar result can be obtained for the (⊕) and (℘)-rules.
To understand linear logic, it is necessary to take a look at the intuitive
meaning of the above additives and multiplicatives derived from their use
by the above rules. First it is important to note that to obtain ⊗ in a
conclusion, no sharing of resources is allowed, while the contrary is the case
for ⊓. Similarly, there is a difference between ℘ and ⊕. In the line of thought
exposed in Girard (1989), the meanings to be attached to the connectives are
the following:
• a⊗ b means that both resources, a and b are given simultaneously ;
• a ⊓ b means that one may choose between a and b ;
• a⊕b means that one of both resources, a or b, is given though we have
lack of knowledge concerning the exact one ;
• a℘b expresses a constructive disjunction.
The meaning of ℘ becomes clearer when we follow J.Y. Girard in his con-
struction that every atomic formula of his linear logical language has by
definition a negation (−)⊥. Running a bit ahead of our story, the meaning of
a℘b will now come down to the situation where “if” not a is given “then” b
is given and “if” not b is given “then” a is given. Of course this explanation
is linked to the commutative case where a linear logical implication is defined
as a⊥℘b := a ⊸ b which by transposition equals b⊥ ⊸ a⊥. In the same
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sense, only in the commutative case where a⊗ b equals b ⊗ a, does it make
sense to say that a⊗ b comes down to simultaneous given resources.
We will be more specific on the linear logical implication and analyze the
underlying philosophical ideas as presented in Girard (1989) where of course
⊸ is defined by means of ℘. What is important is that the linear implication
should mimic exactly what happens when a non-iteratable action is being
performed, where we conceive of a non-iteratable action to be such that after
its performance the initial resources are not available any more as initial
resources. The linear implication should as such express the consumption of
initial resources and simultaneously the production of final resources. Indeed,
as stated in Girard (1995), the linear implication ⊸ expresses a form of
causality: a ⊸ b is to be conceived as “from a get b”. More explicitly
(Girard 1989) :
“A causal implication cannot be iterated since the conditions are
modified after its use; this process of modification of the premises
(conditions) is known in physics as reaction.” (p.72)
or in Girard (2000):
“C’est donc une vision causale de la de´duction logique, qui s’oppose
a` la pe´rennite´ de la ve´rite´ traditionelle en philosophie et en mathe´-
matiques. On a ici des ve´rite´s fugaces, contingentes, domine´es par
l’ide´e de ressource et d’action.” (p.532)
If we understand this correctly, the act of consumption and production is
called a non-iteratable action while the process of modification of initial con-
ditions, the deprivation of resources, is called reaction. The idea of relating
action and reaction is in a sense metaphorically based on Newton’s action-
reaction principle in physics. Girard uses this metaphor also when he ex-
plains why every formula has by definition a linear negation which expresses
a duality or change of standpoint (Girard 1989):
“action of type A = reaction of type A⊥.” (p.77)
or in Girard (2000):
“Concre`tement la ne´gation correspond a` la dualite´ “action/re´action”
et pas du tout a` l’ide´e de ne pas effectuer une action: typique-
ment lire/e´crire, envoyer/recevoir, sont justicibles de la ne´gation
line´aire.” (p.532)
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In terms of functional programming or categorical semantics, the negation
represents an input-output duality. In game terms, it is an opponent-proponent
duality. In Girard (1989) the notion of a reaction of type A⊥, as dual to an
action of type A, is quite mysterious and not further elaborated. The only
thing Girard mentions is that it should come down to an “inversion of causal-
ity, i.e. of the sense of time” (Girard 1989). It is also not clear to us what
this duality would mean in a commutative linear logic context when we con-
sider the case of an action of type a ⊸ b (or b⊥ ⊸ a⊥) and a reaction of
type a ⊗ b⊥ (or b⊥ ⊗ a) — where a ⊸ b = a⊥℘b and (a⊥℘b)⊥ = a ⊗ b⊥.
Thus we tend to agree with Girard (1989) where he says that this discussion
involves not standard but non-commutative linear logic. Indeed, against the
background of the causation-propagation duality elaborated upon above, if
Girard has something similar to causation in mind, we know that what is
necessary is an implication and “non-commutative” conjunction which allow
us to express causation. As we will show further on, switching from standard
to non-commutative linear logic effects the meanings of the linear implication
and linear negation.
Leaving this action-reaction debate aside, we can now explain why our
given interpretation of non-iterability is quite subtle. First note that in
Girard’s standard linear logic, ⊢ a ⊸ a is provable from an empty set of
premises. As such ⊸ represents in a ⊸ a the identity-action which does
not really change resources, but only translates initial ones into final ones.
And although we could perform the action twice in the following sense: a1
⊸ a2 ⊸ a3 — for convenience we labeled the resources — this still does
not count as an iteratable action since a1 is to be conceived as an initial
resource, different from a2, the final resource of the first action. But we can
go further in this discussion and follow Girard in stipulating the fact that we
may still encounter situations in which the picture of “consuming all initial
resources” does not hold. Linear logic henceforth allows also the expression
of those actions which deal with stable situations and which are iteratable.
In the latter case the use of exponentials is necessary where for instance the
exponential ! gives !a the meaning that a’s use as a resource is unlimited.
In Girard (1989), Girard discusses the link between states, transitions and the
linear implication. In particular, for us it is the following statement which
places the linear implication in an interesting context, thinking of course
about the above discussed DoQL, (Girard 1989):
“In fact, we would like to represent states by formulas, and tran-
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sitions by means of implications of states, in such a way that the
state S ′ is accessible from S exactly when S ⊸ S ′ is provable
from the transitions, taken as axioms.” (p.74)
In Girard (1989) this statement applies to for instance systems such as Petri
nets, Turing machines, chessboard games, etc. Focusing “in this sense” on
physical systems, and using⊸ for transitions of states, it becomes interesting
to investigate how⊸ can be conceived in the context of our logic of actuality
sets. While a formal comparison on the semantical level will be given in the
next paragraph we have to stress here that there is on the methodological level
the following point of difference between DoQL and linear logic: contrary to
DoQL, it should be well understood that linear logic is not a temporal logic,
no preconceptions of time or processes is built into it. More explicitly (Girard
1989):
“Linear logic is eventually about time, space and communication,
but is not a temporal logic, or a kind of parallel language: such
approaches try to develop preexisting conceptions about time,
processes, etc. In those matters, the general understanding is so
low that one has good chances to produce systems whose aim is
to avoid the study of their objects [...] The main methodolog-
ical commitment is to refuse any a priori intuition about these
objects of study, and to assume that (at least part of) the tempo-
ral, the parallel features of computation are already in Gentzen’s
approach, but are simply hidden by taxonomy.” (p.104)
As such DoQL started out with a different methodology. The objects of
study are well-known “scientific objects” such as physical systems and their
properties and the inductions performable on physical systems. In a sense
this information has been encrypted in the formulas we used. All dynamic
propagation- and causation-implications have been labeled by inductions,
and this is different from the linear logical implications which are used to ex-
press any (non-specified) transition. In view of quantum theory it is indeed
the case that one cannot speak about observed quantities without specifi-
cation of the particular measurement one performs, and as such, the cor-
responding induction that encodes von Neumann’s projection postulate, or
in more fashionable terms, state-update. Exactly this could form an argu-
ment against applying the linear logical implications in a context of physical
processes. Thus, we are not tempted to agree with the proposal in Pratt
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(1993) of adding linear logical connectives as an extension to quantum logic,
but rather focus on the development of a new logical syntax which will how-
ever have some definite similarities with linear logic, in particular with its
quantale semantical fragment.
In order to get a grasp on the quantale semantics of linear logic we
have to say something about its non-commutative variants. In the liter-
ature on non-commutative linear logic, two main directions emerge. In
a first direction one introduces non-commutativity of the multiplicatives
by restricting the exchange-rule to circular permutations while in a sec-
ond direction one completely drops all structural rules. Concentrating on
the first direction, here linear logic with a cyclic exchange rule is called
cyclic linear logic and has mainly been developed by D.N Yetter in Yet-
ter (1990), though we have to note that Girard already makes some remarks
on cyclic exchanges in Girard (1989) . More explicitly we see that the restric-
tion to cyclic permutations means that we consider the sequents as written
on a circle (Girard 1989) . This then should come down to the fact that
a1 ⊗ ... ⊗ an−1 ⊗ an ⊢ an ⊗ a1 ⊗ ... ⊗ an−1 is provable in cyclic linear logic.
Of course the meaning of ⊗ with respect to the standard case changes in
the sense that it expresses now “and then” (Yetter 1990) or when following
Girard (1989) it means that “in the product b ⊗ a, the second component
is done before the first one”. As we will explain in the next paragraph on
Girard quantales, it is exactly the difference between −⊗ a and a⊗− which
leads to the introduction of two different implication-connectives in cyclic
linear logic: ⊸ and ◦−.
Given a unital quantale (Q,
∨
,⊗), with 1 as the multiplicative neutral
element with respect to ⊗ , it then follows that the endomorphisms a ⊗ −,
−⊗ a : Q→ Q have right adjoints, a⊸ − and −◦−a respectively:
a⊗ c ≤ b⇔ c ≤ a⊸ b c⊗ a ≤ b⇔ c ≤ b ◦−a
a⊸ b =
∨
{c ∈ Q : a⊗ c ≤ b} b ◦−a =
∨
{c ∈ Q : c⊗ a ≤ b} .
We know that in the standard linear logic as presented by Girard, the fol-
lowing holds a⊸ b = a⊥℘b = (a⊗ b⊥)⊥ = (b⊥ ⊗ a)⊥ = b℘a⊥ = b⊥ ⊸ a⊥.
In cyclic linear logic where we have now two implications, things change in
the sense that we obtain:
(a⊗ b)⊥ = b⊥℘a⊥ (a℘b)⊥ = b⊥ ⊗ a⊥
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a⊸ b = a⊥℘b b ◦−a = b℘a⊥
To be more explicit, the linear negation can be interpreted in the unital
quantale (Q,
∨
,⊗, 1) by means of a cyclic dualizing element, which can be
defined as follows (Rosenthal 1990, Yetter 1990) :
• An element ⊥ ∈ Q is dualizing iff ⊥ ◦−(a⊸⊥) = a = (⊥ ◦−a)⊸⊥
for all a ∈ Q . It is cyclic iff a⊸⊥=⊥ ◦−a, for every a ∈ Q .
Here the operation −⊸⊥ or equivalently ⊥ ◦−− is called the linear nega-
tion and can be written as (−)⊥. Note that a unital quantale with a cyclic
dualizing element ⊥ is called a Girard quantale , a notion having been in-
troduced in Yetter (1990) . These Girard quantales can be equipped with
modal operators to interpret the linear logical exponentials and form as such
a straightforward semantics for the cyclic as well as standard linear logical
syntax. In the latter case a ⊸ b = b ◦−a. The disadvantage suffered by
cyclic linear logic is that it is still not “non-commutative enough to properly
express time’s arrow” (Yetter 1990). Indeed, if ⊸ is to be conceived as a
causal implication then it would have been nice to conceive ◦− as express-
ing past causality, though this interpretation is too misleading according to
(Girard 1989). In a way we agree with him since in cyclic linear logic a⊸ b
and a⊥ ◦−b⊥ are the same — in the sense that they are both equal to a⊥℘b.
Focusing on the second direction in the non-commutative linear logical
literature, we first have to mention the work of J. Lambek. Lambek’s syntac-
tic calculus originated in Lambek (1958) and as Girard admits, is the non-
commutative ancestor of linear logic. However it has to be mentioned that
Lambek’s syntactic calculus, as originally developed against a linguistic back-
ground, is essentially multiplicative and intuitionistic. Later on Lambek ex-
tended his syntactic calculus with additives and recently renamed his formal
calculus bilinear logic. In the same direction we can place the work of V.M.
Abrusci who developed a non-commutative version of the intuitionistic linear
propositional logic in Abrusci (1990) and of the classical linear propositional
logic in Abrusci (1991). Specific to Abrusci’s work, however, is the fact that
a full removal of the exchange rule requires the introduction of two different
negations and two different implications. To explain this in detail we switch
to the semantical level of quantales; where we want to note that Abrusci
works in Abrusci (1990, 1991) with the more specific structure of phase spaces
which as proved in Rosenthal (1990) are examples of quantales. This then
leads to the fact that for a ∈ Q: ⊥ ◦−(a⊸⊥) 6= (⊥ ◦−a)⊸ a. Here we can
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follow Abrusci and define ⊥ ◦−(a⊸⊥) = ⊥(a⊥) and (⊥ ◦−a)⊸⊥= (⊥a)⊥ ,
where on the syntactical level a⊥ is called the linear postnegation, ⊥a the
linear retronegation, a ⊸ b the linear postimplication and b ◦−a the lin-
ear retroimplication. Further on the syntactical level we obviously have
a⊥℘b = a ⊸ b while b℘⊥a = b ◦−a. Let us finish of this paragraph with
a note on the fact that there is of course much more to say about (non)-
commutative linear logic, indeed contemporary research is in full development
and heads in the direction of combining cyclic linear logic with commutative
linear logic, we however limit ourselves for the time being to the overview
given.
Given the above expositions, it follows that (DI(L),
∨
DI(L),⊗e) , the
quantale fragment emerging for propagation for a specific induction e , pro-
vides an example of the quantale obtained for commutative linear logic. Note
that the difference of course lies in the fact that in commutative linear logic
no retro-implication different from ⊸ is present, not even as an additional
structure. In this respect, to obtain a retro-implication in linear logic it is
necessary to move to a non-commutative linear logic providing a single quan-
tale in which to interpret⊸ and ◦− , in sharp contrast to our constructions
allowing the interpretation of
e
→ and
e
← for each specific e . Finally, let us
note that while the implication ⊸, when focusing on it as an implication
expressing simultaneous consumption of initial resources and production of
final resources, is much stronger than
e
→, it can nevertheless be reconstructed
within the framework of DoQL, for which we refer to Smets (2001).
5. CONCLUSION
It seems to us that an actual attitude towards the logic of dynamics ought
to be pluralistic, as it follows from our two main paradigmatic examples,
dynamic operational quantum logic and Girard’s linear logic.
The mentioned attempts that aim to integrate the logic of dynamics as
it emerges from for example physical and proof theoretic considerations fail
either on formal grounds or due to conceptual inconsistency. We indeed
provided a non-classical physical counterexample to van Benthem’s general
dynamic logic, and argued that even for classical systems, from a physical
perspective adjoints rather than relational inverses should be the formal bases
for the logic of dynamics.
We end by mentioning two promising recent alternative approaches in
relating quantum features and linear logic, in Blute et al (2001) in terms of
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polycategories and deduction systems and in Abramsky and Coecke (2002)
in terms of geometry of interaction in categorical format, that is, in terms of
traced monoidal categories. It is however to soon to obtain conclusions from
these lines of thought.
6. NOTES
1. From now on OQL will only refer to Geneva School operational quantum logic.
2. It is exactly the particular operational foundation of ontological concepts that
has caused a lot of confusion with respect to this approach, including some
attacks on it due to misunderstandings stemming from identification of “what
is”, “what is observed”, “what will be observed”, “what would be observed”,
“what could be observed”, etc. We don’t refer to these papers but cite one that
refutes them in a more than convincing way, namely Foulis and Randall (1984) .
We recall here that it were D.J. Foulis and C.H. Randall who developed an
empirical counterpart to C. Piron’s ontological approach (Foulis and Randall
1972, Foulis et al 1983, Randall and Foulis 1983). We also quote the review of
R. Piziak in Mathematical Reviews of one of these attacks of Piron’s approach
exposing their somewhat doubtful aims (MR86i:81012):
“... in fact, they confused the very essence of Piron’s system of
questions and propositions, the sharp distinction between proper-
ties of a physical system and operationally testable propositions
about the system. [...] In their reply to Foulis and Randall, HT
ignore the list of mathematical errors, confusions and blunders
in their papers except for one (a minor one at that). HT simply
reissue their challenge and dismiss the work of Foulis and Ran-
dall as well as Piron as being “useless from the physicist’s point of
view”. However, when one finds an argument in HTM (the main
theorem of their 1981 paper) to the effect that the failure to prove
the negation of a theorem constitutes a proof of the theorem, one
might form a different opinion as to whose work is ‘useless’. It is
right and proper for any scientific work to be scrutinized and crit-
icized according to its merits. Indeed, this is a main impetus to
progress. But if mathematics is to be used as a tool of criticism,
let it be used properly.”
See also Smets (2001) for an overview of most of the criticism and its refutal on
sOQL. We refer to Coecke (nd) for a formulation of sOQL where a conceptually
somewhat less rigid, but more general perspective is proposed, avoiding the
notion of test or definite experimental project in the definition of a physical
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property as an ontological quality of a system. One of the motivations for this
reformulation is exactly the confusion that the current formulation seems to
cause — although there is definitely nothing wrong with it as the truly careful
reader knows, on the contrary in fact.
3.We are not implying that our scientific theories are to be based on obtained
measurement-results. The oft-drawn conclusion from this stating that “onto-
logical existence is independent from any measurement or observation” also
holds in our view. It is however specific for our position, which may not be
share by every scientific realist, that our knowledge of what exists is linked to
what we could measure, stated counterfactually. As such we adopt an “endo
perspective”, measurements are not a priori part of our universe of discourse
but incorporated in a conditional way, it is in this sense that e.g. two not
simultaneously observable properties which ontologically exist, can both un-
problematically be incorporated in our description. We refer to Coecke and
Smets (2001) for more details on the “endo versus exo perspective”. A some-
what related view we want to draw to your attention is put forward in Ghins
(2000), where he argues that from the affirmation of some “existence”, under a
criterion of existence based on the conditions of “presence” and “invariance”,
certain counterfactuals should reasonably also be affirmed.
4.We are well aware of the fact that several correspondence theories of truth
have been put forward and have also been criticised. Adhering to some form of
scientific realism does not necessarily imply that one accepts a correspondence
theory, even more it has been suggested that the debate on the notion of
truth can be cut loose from the debate on realism versus anti-realism — see
for instance Horwich (1997), Tarski (1944). Still, against the background of
sOQL, we are sympathetic towards a contemporary account of a Tarskian-style
semantic correspondence theory — see for example Niiniluoto (1999, §3.4).
5. In the line of C. Piron (1981) we note that in general, the actual performance
of a definite experimental project can at most serve to prove the falsity of a
physicists’ assumptions, it cannot hand out a prove for them to be true.
6. Note here the similarity with the generation of a quantale structure within the
context of process semantics for computational systems sensu Abramsky and
Vickers (1993) and Resende (2000) .
7. Different approaches however do exist for considering potentially destructive
measurements, see for example Faure et al (1995), Amira et al (1998), Coecke
and Stubbe (1999), Coecke et al (2001) and in particular Sourbron (2000) .
8. From this point on we will identify those inductions which have the same action
on properties, i.e., we abstract from the physical procedure to its transitional
effect.
9. A pair of maps f∗ : L → M and f∗ : M → L between posets L and M are
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Galois adjoint, denoted by f∗ ⊣ f∗ , if and only if f
∗(a) ≤ b ⇔ a ≤ f∗(b)
if and only if ∀a ∈ M : f∗(f∗(a)) ≤ a and ∀a ∈ L : a ≤ f∗(f
∗(a)) . One
could somewhat abusively say that Galois adjointness generalizes the notion of
inverse maps to non-isomorphic objects: in the case that f∗ and f∗ are inverse,
and thus L and M isomorphic, the above inequalities saturate in equalities.
Whenever f∗ ⊣ f∗, f∗ preserves all existing joins and f∗ all existing meets.
This means that for a Galois adjoint pair between complete lattices, one of
these maps preserves all meets and the other preserves all joins. Conversely,
for L and M complete lattices, any meet preserving map f∗ : M → L has a
unique join preserving left Galois adjoint f∗ : a 7→
∧
{b ∈ M |a ≤ f∗(b)} and
any join preserving map f∗ : L → M a unique meet preserving right adjoint
f∗ : b 7→
∨
{a ∈ L|f∗(a) ≤ b} .
10. This dual representation is included in the duality between the categories Inf
of complete lattices and meet-preserving maps and Sup of complete lattices
and join preserving maps, since this duality is exactly established in terms of
Galois adjunction at the morphism level — see Coecke et al (2001) for details.
11. See also Amira et al (1998) and Coecke and Stubbe (1999) for a similar devel-
opment in terms of a so-called operational resolution on the state set.
12. Let us briefly describe the more rigid argumentation. Consider the following
definitions for A ⊆ L : i.
∨
A is called disjunctive iff (
∨
A actual⇔ ∃a ∈ A : a
actual) ; ii. Superposition states for
∨
A are states for which
∨
A is actual
while no a ∈ A is actual ; iii. Superposition properties for
∨
A are properties
c <
∨
A whose actuality doesn’t imply that at least one a ∈ A is actual. We
then have that (
∨
A disjunctive ⇔
∨
A distributive) provided that existence
of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties (Coecke
2002) . Moreover, any complete lattice L has the complete Heyting algebra
DI(L) of distributive ideals as its distributive hull (Bruns and Lakser 1970),
providing it with a universal property . The inclusion preserves all meets and
existing distributive joins. Thus, DI(L) encodes all possible disjunctions of
properties, and moreover, it turns out that all DI(L)-meets are conjunctive
and all DI(L)-joins are disjunctive — note that this is definitely not the case
in the powerset P (L) of a property lattice, nor in the order ideals I(L) or-
dered by inclusion . It follows from this that the object equivalence between:
i. complete lattices, and, ii. complete Heyting algebras equipped with a dis-
tributive closure (i.e., it preserves distributive sets), encodes an intuitionistic
representation for operational quantum logic — see Coecke (2002) for details.
13. The following map eˆ∗ : P (Σ)1 → P (Σ)2 provides a counterexample: Let Σ1 =
Σ2 := {p, q, r, s} with as closed subsets {∅, {p}, {q}, {r}, {s}, {q, r, s},Σ} ⊂
P (Σ)1 = P (Σ)2 , and set eˆ
∗({p}) 7→ {p, q} , eˆ∗({q}) 7→ {q} , eˆ∗({r}) 7→
{r} , eˆ∗({s}) 7→ {s} ; one verifies that although
∨
{q, r} =
∨
{r, s} we have
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∨
f
R−1e
({q, r}) =
∨
{p, q, r} 6=
∨
{r, s} =
∨
f
R−1e
({r, s}) since
∨
{p, q, r} yields
the top element of the property lattice and
∨
{r, s} doesn’t .
14. Note here that in accordance to the literature on linear logic, contra section 2
and section 3 of this paper, we do use the terms conjunction and disjunction
beyond their strict intuitionistic significance. This however should not cause
any confusion.
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